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HOW I BECAME A CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHER
Ralph McInerny

I began graduate studies in philosophy at the University of Minnesota in
the Fall quarter of 1951. My undergraduate philosophy had been done in
the St. Paul Seminary where I had a number of professors who had
taken their degrees at Laval University under Charles DeKoninck. In
those days Laval was a redoubt of Thomism of the strict observance and
my ultimate intention was to go there. But, having decided not to return
to the seminary it was more immediately practical to enroll at
Minnesota. Like so many decisions along the way of life, this was one
made in obscurity and without any notion of its importance. But it was, I
think, providential.
Minnesota was then in a golden age. Herbert Feigl, Wilfrid Sellars,
John Hospers, and May Brodbeck formed the analytic/positivist main
group in the department. D. B. Terrell, who was to become an expert on
Brentano, was the youngster of the department. And Paul Holmer was
already massively sui generis and for many of us a mentor. I wrote my
master's dissertation with Holmer and am eternally grateful to him for
introducing me to Kierkegaard. Minnesota was on the quarter system so
one took a great many courses: I took four each from Sellars and
Holmer, had logic from Brodbeck, contemporary philosophy with
Terrill, and minored in classics.
That year at Minnesota established three points of reference for my
philosophizing. The first was supplied by such dominant figures as Feigl
and Sellars, heirs of the Vienna Circle, and champions of a philosophy
that snuggled up as close as possible to science, hopeful that some of its
prestige would rub off on its own lesser efforts. Holmer on the other
hand taught courses in Jaspers, in Kierkegaard, in Cassirer, that provided an alternative to the analytic element. Above all, Holmer's courses
intimated when they did not assert the role of religious faith in the
philosopher's enterprise. The third point on the triangle was Thomism.
Sellars, with whom I studied Descartes, Leibniz and Kant, was amused
by papers in which I sought to juxtapose Kant and Aquinas, Descartes
and Thomism. He was certain that immersion in the empiricists would
be my salvation. My dissertation was called A Thomistic Evaluation of
Kierkegaard. Without fully realizing it, I was undertaking to philosophize
thomistically but with constant reference to the secularizing philosophizing of Feigl/Sellars and the Christian fideism of a Holmer. I went on
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to Laval where I took my doctorate under DeKoninck and deepened my
understanding of St. Thomas.
After a year at Creighton, I joined the philosophy department at
Notre Dame in 1955. During my first years here-I think of them now as
pre conciliar years-there was a common effort to work from a shared
Thomistic base in the direction of ongoing contemporary philosophy
with an eye to finding a distinctive synthesis of the best of the best. That
was predicated on sharing a common basis, an assumption that would
be destroyed by the attitude induced by Vatican II. In the mid-1960s
many who had hitherto been committed Thomists suddenly announced
that they were through with all that and must now be thought of as analytic philosophers, existentialists, phenomenologists, Whiteheadians, etc.
At its lowest level, there was an unseemly desire to join whatever was
taken to be in the philosophical ascendancy. We ended up with variety
but no rationale for it. I wrote Thomism in all Age of RCllelual in 1966 and it
can serve as a contemporary record of those days.
When the Fellowship of Christian Scholars was formed I came to it
out of a different background than believers who had, let us say, accepted as good money what they had learned in graduate school and only
later came to see that the dominant views posed difficulties for their
Christian beliefs. As neophytes, we were confronted by the received
opinion, more assumed than expressed, that the serious pursuit of philosophy would lead inevitably to the fading away of religious faith.
Discussions of "religious language," the defenses even more than the
attacks, offered a stone rather than bread to the believing philosopher.
And of course we were all supposed to know that attempts to prove the
existence of God must fail, there being no God.
Believing philosophers needed air, they needed space in which they
could reflect in a receptive, not a hostile, way on their beliefs and on the
relations of faith and philosophy. It had become tiresome to spend so
much time showing that you were not speaking nonsense. It was altogether too much like being asked if one had stopped beating one's wife.
What was needed was a coming together of philosophers for whom faith
was not an embarrassment or impediment to philosophy, but its spur
and support. There was need for a Society of Christian Philosophers.
The effort took two main forms. First, there was the tu quoque or "So's
your old man" approach. Some of the hilarious assumptions of proponents of a secularized philosophy had to be displayed to public amusement. No one is more adept at this than Al Plantinga, a sign of which is
that the procedure came to be called alvinizing. One who professed to
find insuperable difficulties in the existence of God was shown that he
must then have similar difficulties with other minds. The second form
was illustrated by the introduction of topics such as atonement and the
Trinity and the like to the philosophical agenda on the assumption that
there was no law preventing a philosopher from turning his mind to
these. It is here that I must confess I have misgivings about our success.
To put it Thomistically, I think there has often been a blurring of the
distinction between philosophy and theology. If philosophy is discourse
that pins itself to truths that are in the public domain, so that an argu-
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ment must always be hooked up to the things that in principle everybody knows, those being the starting points or principles of philosophy,
theology pins itself to truths that are taken to be such on the basis of
divine faith, e.g. the Incarnation, Trinity, atonement, etc. Discussion of
these by philosophers can suggest that there are principles in the public
domain sufficient to guide one in such discussions. But of course there is
nothing here to discuss of a truth-bearing kind apart from faith. It is revelation that delivers such truths to us and the grace of faith is the name
for the acceptance of them as true. But this is to pin one's arguments to
truths that are not in the public domain, that is, what any mind can in
principle be taken to know.
One reaction to this is to say that Augustine was not as demanding as
Thomas and seems to jumble up philosophy and faith without hesitation. This is a large matter, of course, but in the end it seems to me to
amount to a decision to engage in theology rather than philosophy-but
without a net. The net would be an overt appeal to revelation.
I should add that there are many Thomists nowadays who downplay
the difference between philosophy and theology, and who suggest that
there can be no such thing as Thomistic philosophy. Another large subject and one that I shall address in my Gifford lectures at Glasgow in '99.
The bright side to this is that it becomes inescapable that reflections on
the Trinity and Incarnation, those at any rate that are truth-bearing,
begin with the truth of those mysteries. With faith. With revelation. We
as a society have had occasion to encounter head-on the chaos of biblical
scholarship. As a Catholic, I find a reading of Vatican II's Dei verbum an
indispensable guide in these matters. Charlotte AIIen's forthcoming
book (Free Press) The Human Christ: The Quest for the Historical Jesus
makes all too clear what can be expected from the soi-disant experts in
this area. Kierkegaard cited Lichtenburg on the Bible: "Such books are
mirrors, if a monkey looks in, no apostle looks out."
One finds in St. Anselm the teaching that the souls of the blessed are
meant to take the places left vacant in heaven by the fallen angels. When
I look at the post-conciliar history of the Catholic church, particularly in
universities, I am gripped with an Anselmian hope that philosophers
will flow from the society to take the places of those of my generation
who have been such inadequate custodians of the faith. Ut unum sint, as
Our Lord prayed. May they be one.
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